Executives are impersonated to authorise payments, their personal accounts are used to reach corporate systems and their public exposure makes them targets for extortion and harassment. This module protects the people whose compromise would hurt the organisation most, discreetly and with their consent.
Senior leaders use personal devices and accounts, speak at events, appear in press and have families and assistants who are also targeted. Attackers exploit all of it: a convincing voice note to the finance team, a fake profile offering a board seat, a personal password reused on a corporate system.
We assess each person's exposure, monitor for impersonation, credential and data exposure and threats, and respond with takedowns, resets and guidance. Programmes are agreed with each individual and with the organisation, with strict limits on what is collected and who sees it.
Executives are impersonated to authorise payments, their personal accounts are used to reach corporate systems and their public exposure makes them targets for extortion. The attack surface is a person's life, which is why the programme is confidential and agreed with each individual.
What an attacker can learn about each executive from open sources, breaches and infostealer logs, and how it could be used against the organisation.
Fake profiles, cloned accounts, deepfake-enabled fraud attempts and messages sent in the executive's name to staff, partners or customers.
Exposed credentials and sessions from personal devices and accounts that connect to corporate systems, with remediation handled privately.
Monitoring for the publication of personal data, threats and coordinated harassment, with escalation to security and law enforcement where needed.
Rapid response when an executive's identity is used for payment fraud, with the finance controls and the evidence needed to stop the loss.
Optional extension to the close circle attackers use as a route to the executive, agreed with each person.
Removal of impersonations and recovery of hijacked personal accounts, with platform escalation paths.
Short, practical guidance for executives and their assistants on devices, accounts, travel and public appearances, and briefings before sensitive events.
A confidential exposure assessment per executive, discussed one to one.
Resets, privacy settings, account hardening and removal of exposed data where possible.
Continuous monitoring for impersonation, exposure and threats, with agreed limits.
Takedowns, recovery, fraud response and law enforcement liaison when an incident occurs.
Clear, usable outputs for executives, technical teams, insurers and regulators.
Each programme is agreed with the individual. We collect only what is needed, keep personal findings separate from corporate reporting and share them only with the person concerned unless they decide otherwise.
Often, partly. Data brokers, platforms and search engines have removal processes that we handle, and we are clear about what cannot be removed and how to reduce its impact.
Yes. We monitor for impersonation attempts, brief finance and assistant teams on verification procedures and respond when an attempt is detected.
No. It is designed for the people whose compromise would hurt most: board members, finance, legal, founders, public-facing executives and the assistants who manage their access.
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Read articleWant to know what an attacker could learn about your leadership team? Ask for a confidential exposure assessment.